Los famosos sueños de Descartes han constituido siempre para la historia de la filosofía un incómodo problema, pues dejaban la puerta abierta a la posibilidad de que el origen de la moderna racionalidad hubiese nacido de lo irracional. Superar este problema no fue fácil para el propio Descartes pasados los años ni lo ha sido para quienes desde entonces han mantenido que sus ideas marcaron el origen de una etapa de la filosofía y la ciencia caracterizada por el rechazo de (...) cualquier tipo de saber basado en la iluminación, la revelación o la inspiración mística. La mayoría de los autores han intentado marginar tal carácter irracional de los orígenes de la racionalidad realizando una lectura de los sueños cartesianos a la luz del posterior desarrollo del pensamiento cartesiano. Aquí se propone, en cambio, hacer una valoración de aquellos sueños en el contexto de las inquietudes intelectuales que el francés tenía en 1619. Hay elementos en la descripción de los sueños cartesianos, como la relevancia otorgada al «entusiasmo», o la revelación de una nueva ciencia «desde lo alto», que la vinculan estrechamente con una concepción de la verdad y la razón muy cercana a la de platónicos, filósofos y poetas que posteriormente la historia de la filosofía ha considerado en las antípodas de la moderna racionalidad. (shrink)

This paper is part of an attempt to offer a better understanding of the origins of modern science in the light of the transformations of the concept of representation through XVIth and XVIIth centuries. My aim here is to point out how Francis Bacon had to revise naturalistic and mimetic conceptions of language for drawing up his particular methodical empiricism. In other words, it was not possible to formulate the modern scientific empiricism without advancing a criticism of those naturalistic philosophies (...) of language which had so great success in the XVIth century. To get to this conclusion, I set out here how the results achieved by those who united their empirical study of nature with mimetic and naturalistic conceptions of language were irremediably far from the open and progressive model of scientific knowledge which was an essential element of the Baconian project. (shrink)

Most philosophical and historiographical interpretations of the origins of modern science have conferred an essential relevance to the importance attached to experience and experiment during sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. These epistemological categories have been very often deemed basic concepts that need not any further analysis. As an alternative interpretation, this paper rather suggests to think over the philosophical and scientifical evolution of the concept of experience itself up to seventeeenth century. The chain sensation-memory-experience that Aristotle had provided as the way (...) to the establishing of first principles of science, was after worked out by scholastic thinkers who made of the concept of “experience” a kind of historical knowledge necessary to science although prior to it and deeply legitimated by the authority of tradition criteria and the concept of “common opinion”. Seventeenth century science, undertook from different philosophical and disciplinary approaches a criticism as well as a reformulation of the said category of “historical experience”. As a consequence of it science was obliged to search for new legitimating strategies for empirical knowledge. This paper aims to point out the outcomes of this process of experience rationalization, as well as the consequences of considering experience not merely a prior condition, but an essential part of scientific knowledge. (shrink)

Most philosophical and historiographical interpretations of the origins of modern science have conferred an essential relevance to the importance attached to experience and experiment during sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. These epistemological categories have been very often deemed basic concepts that need not any further analysis. As an alternative interpretation, this paper rather suggests to think over the philosophical and scientifical evolution of the concept of experience itself up to seventeeenth century. The chain sensation-memory-experience that Aristotle had provided as the way (...) to the establishing of first principles of science, was after worked out by scholastic thinkers who made of the concept of “experience” a kind of historical knowledge necessary to science although prior to it and deeply legitimated by the authority of tradition criteria and the concept of “common opinion”. Seventeenth century science, undertook from different philosophical and disciplinary approaches a criticism as well as a reformulation of the said category of “historical experience”. As a consequence of it science was obliged to search for new legitimating strategies for empirical knowledge. This paper aims to point out the outcomes of this process of experience rationalization, as well as the consequences of considering experience not merely a prior condition, but an essential part of scientific knowledge. (shrink)